~ / rigs / viehgroup / agentscan

viehgroup/agentscan

Find leaked keys, risky permissions and hidden instructions in AI agent configs: Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Gemini CLI and MCP.

↗ GitHub ★ 1 MIT updated 3d ago project Claude CodeCursor
stack: Python
share on X
ARCHETYPE
YOLO Cowboy
Permissions? Never heard of 'em. Ships at the speed of `--dangerously-skip-permissions`.
CONTEXT TAX · EVERY TURN
up to ~25.2k tokens
Claude Code loads MCP tools on demand, so the real cost is usually lower.
Context hog · median rig: 2.3k · breakdown
GUARDRAILS
0/5
No committed guardrails · details
Quality 3/100 Guardrails v2

Copy this rig

# review before running: this installs third-party code
$ claude mcp add github -e GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_<redacted> -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-github
$ claude mcp add --transport http internal-api http://mcp.example.internal/sse -H 'Authorization: YOUR_VALUE'
$ claude mcp add fetch -- uvx mcp-server-fetch
$ claude mcp add pinned -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@2025.8.21 .
$ npx degit viehgroup/agentscan/examples/demo/.claude ./rig-agentscan  # inspect, then merge into .claude/

MCP servers are added to Claude Code at local scope; env vars are shown as YOUR_… placeholders — we never store values. Files are fetched with degit into a separate folder so you can review before merging.

$ claude mcp add github -e GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_<redacted> -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-github
$ claude mcp add --transport http internal-api http://mcp.example.internal/sse -H 'Authorization: YOUR_VALUE'
$ claude mcp add fetch -- uvx mcp-server-fetch
$ claude mcp add pinned -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@2025.8.21 .

This rig commits no guardrails. Here is the community baseline instead — the deny/ask rules most often found across all 16.2k rigs:

{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "Read(./.env)",
      "Read(./.env.*)",
      "Read(**/.env)",
      "Read(~/.ssh/**)",
      "Bash(git push --force:*)",
      "Read(**/*.pem)",
      "Read(.env)",
      "Read(~/.aws/**)",
      "Read(**/*.key)",
      "Read(**/.env.*)",
      "Bash(git push --force*)",
      "Bash(rm -rf:*)",
      "Bash(rm -rf *)",
      "Bash(sudo *)",
      "Bash(sudo:*)",
      "Bash(rm -rf /)",
      "Bash(git push -f:*)",
      "Read(.env.*)",
      "Bash(git reset --hard*)",
      "Bash(rm -rf /*)"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "Bash(git push:*)",
      "Bash(git push *)",
      "Bash(gh pr merge *)",
      "Bash(git commit:*)",
      "Bash(rm *)",
      "Bash(gh pr merge:*)",
      "Bash(gh pr create *)",
      "Bash(git reset --hard:*)",
      "Bash(npm publish:*)",
      "Bash(git rebase *)"
    ]
  }
}

MCP servers (4)

serversourceest. tokens
GitHub MCP · "github"
env: GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN
npm 18.0k
mcp.example.internal · "internal-api" remote · remote 2.5k
Fetch pypi 450
Filesystem · "pinned" npm 4.2k

Cursor rules (1)

style

Permissions

deny (0)
—
ask (0)
—
allow (3)
Bash(npm test:*)
Bash(curl:*)
Bash

Similar rigs

copied ✓