Copy this rig quick start guardrails only
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sully-vian/dotfiles copy MCP servers are added to Claude Code at local scope; env vars are shown as YOUR_… placeholders — we never store values. Files are fetched with degit into a separate folder so you can review before merging.
Merge into .claude/settings.json (project) or ~/.claude/settings.json (user). Hook commands reference scripts in the source repo — copy those too.
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "rtk hook claude"
}
]
}
]
}
} copy json Hooks (2) event matcher runs PreToolUse Bash rtk hook claude Stop * : # noop
Plugins (4) claude-code-wakatime@wakatime lua-lsp@claude-plugins-official jdtls-lsp@claude-plugins-official clangd-lsp@claude-plugins-official
Context tax
Instructions: 241 MCP tool schemas (est.): 0 Skill metadata: 0 Subagent metadata: 0
ALWAYS-LOADED FILES (claude-code)
Estimate: characters ÷ 4 for instruction files and skill/subagent descriptions; MCP schema sizes from typical tool counts. Harnesses with deferred tool loading pay less. Method
Guardrails 2/5 · quality 15/100 ✗ No deny/ask rule for rm -rf, force-push, reset --hard, sudo…
✗ No deny rule for .env / keys / ~/.ssh
✓ Permission prompts stay on
✗ No sandbox and no ask-first rules
Destructive-command coverage 0/22 dangerous variants covered by deny/ask rules or a blocking hook. Missed: rm -rf rm -r -f rm -fr rm -Rf find -delete git push --force git push -f git push --force-with-lease git reset --hard git clean -fdx sudo chmod -R 777 dd mkfs curl | sh terraform destroy kubectl delete npm publish DROP TABLE Known bypasses not caught: /bin/rm -rf (absolute path) bash -c 'rm -rf …' git -C . push --force
×35% 0
Secret protection breadth Not denied: .env* (Read), .env* (Edit), *.pem / *.key (Read), *.pem / *.key (Edit), ~/.ssh (Read), ~/.ssh (Edit), ~/.aws (Read), ~/.aws (Edit)…
×25% 0
Hook effectiveness unknown (script not in the repo, not graded)Bash rtk hook claude → unknown
×15% 0
No-YOLO + allow-list hygiene No YOLO mode, no broad allows
×15% 100
Instruction clarity Explicit never/always rules found for: none · missing: deletion, secrets, git, prod
×10% 0
Deterministic static analysis, identical in the crawler and here. Nothing is executed. Hooks whose scripts live outside the repo are "unknown", not a pass.
Add the badge Show this rig's score in your README. Paste this Markdown:
[](https://agentrigs.dev/r/sully-vian/dotfiles/?ref=badge) copy The badge updates by itself after each daily crawl. What the score means · remove this rig
TO RAISE THIS SCORE
Add deny rules for destructive commands to .claude/settings.json, e.g. "Bash(rm -rf:*)", "Bash(git push --force:*)", "Bash(git reset --hard:*)". Deny reads of secrets, e.g. "Read(./.env*)", "Read(~/.ssh/**)", "Read(**/*.pem)". Add "ask" rules for commands you want to confirm (e.g. "Bash(git push:*)"), or enable the sandbox with "sandbox": {"enabled": true}. Indexed from commit 81ae021215ea on 2026-11-17. Data is structure only — env values and anything secret-looking are stripped.